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Surrounding Areas and The Recalibration of Japan’s Threat 
Perception 
 
 
Abstract:  The official narratives of Surrounding Areas in the 1997 New Guidelines 
are a curiosity: on the one hand, they signify Japan’s readiness to enhance its 
international involvement; while on the other hand, the geographical designation 
remains vague despite Japan’s preoccupation with Asia. This suggests that Asia as 
Japan’s neighbourhood is combined with international developments to facilitate an 
emergence of an ambiguous language for Japanese policy makers as they seek to adapt 
to changes in the international environment. As such, Surrounding Areas signify 
Tokyo’s anxieties in facing up to new challenges, as well as willingness by the 
government to enhance Japan’s international role while maintaining its status as a 
pacifist state. 
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Japan’s use of ‘peaceful state’ (heiwa kokka) as a signifier of its international 
goodwill cohabitates with Japanese policy makers’ preoccupation with Northeast Asia 
as a primary geographical concern. Following 9/11, Japan participated in the so-called 
‘War on Terror’, and despite domestic debates over the constitutionality of assisting 
US forces in the Indian Ocean, the previous Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) 
government adopted a language of omnipresent, yet indeterminate, ‘danger’ until it 
was defeated in the August 2009 election. However, even the succeeding coalition 
governments led by the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) succumbed to the ‘reality’ of 
threat perception. 
 Superficially, the post-9/11 threat assessments conflict with Japan’s 
regionalised, historical, conception of danger emerging from the Korean Peninsula 
and Taiwan Strait. The US plans to review its commitment in the Asia-Pacific add 
new dimension to Japan’s post-war identity narrative: a pacifist state pro-actively 
seeking to maintain peace and stability in Northeast Asia and beyond. The 1997 
Guidelines for US-Japan Defence Co-operation (the New Guidelines) require Tokyo 
to tread precariously between maintaining its peace state identity and reassuring its 
Asian neighbours of its good intentions, on the one hand; while seeking to enhance its 
international role by recalibrating threat perception to extend beyond Northeast Asia, 
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on the other. The emergence of the official narratives of ‘Surrounding Areas’—or 
more precisely the ‘areas surrounding Japan’ (shuhen chiiki/shuhen jitai)—denotes 
some form of a rhetorical compromise. At first glance, its definition seems logical; but 
the political reality is one of ambiguity whereby ‘areas surrounding Japan’ are not 
geographical, but situational signifiers (Katzenstein and Okawara, 2001/2: 171, n. 62; 
The Economist, 22 September 2001: 68). Indeed, a former Foreign Minister, Ikeda 
Yukihiko, suggested in 1997 that ‘what happens determines the location’ (Asashi 
shimbun, 1 August 1997: 2). This is in stark contrast to the explicit identification of 
the Far East (kyokuto) as Japan’s defence perimeter in both the 1978 Guidelines and 
the Mutual Security Agreement (MSA) of 1960. 
 The landslide victory by the DPJ in the August 2009 election introduced an 
element of uncertainty. The Party was initially sceptical of the New Guidelines, and in 
its election manifesto, the DPJ maintained its intention of establishing an ‘intimate 
and equal (kinmitsu de taito) relationship’ with the US, while admitting that the US-
Japan alliance constitutes the basis for Japanese foreign policy (Nippon gaiko no 
kiban). 1  Following Prime Minister Hatoyama’s resignation, the new DPJ prime 
minister, Kan Naoto, told the Diet in June 2010 that his intention is to pursue a 
‘realist’ (genjitsu-teki), rather than ‘ideological’, diplomacy, reiterating the familiar 
dictum that ‘the US-Japan alliance is an invaluable international asset not only for 
Japan’s security, but for the stability and prosperity of the Asia-Pacific region’.2 The 
official language of pacifism remains a salient feature of Japan’s international posture 
revealing the psychological landscape within the Japanese government.  
 This article is an exploration into a shift in the official language of Japan’s 
threat perception as represented through the narratives of both the Surrounding Areas 
and pacifism in the pre-August 2009 policy pronouncements. While it is tempting to 
dismiss this as a mere publicity stunt, the fact that such an ambiguous language exists 
at policy levels needs to be taken seriously. How are pacifism and Japan’s enhanced 
military role reconciled within the official narratives? Is pacifism a mere lip-service?  
I argue that the Surrounding Areas constitute a recalibration of threat perception 
while pacifism as a convenient rhetorical tool remains the predominant language 
through which contemporary threat perception is legitimised. The ambiguities of 
                                                 
1  DPJ Manifesto, <www.dpj.or.jp/special/manifesto2009/txt/manifesto2009.txt>. Accessed 2 
September 2009. 
2 <http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/kan/statement/201006/11syosin.html>. Accessed 19 July 2010.  
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Surrounding Areas represent the cohabitation of change and continuity—a 
transformation in the way international environment is seen through a reified 
perception of ‘Asia’ as Japan’s existential milieu. In the first section, I discuss how 
we can conceptualise recalibration of threat perception in which the reified signifier of 
pacifism provides the platform upon which emergent threats are perceived. The 
second section discusses the transformation of ‘danger’ as a historical process, 
whereby Asia as a geographical designation and the defence of Sea Lines of 
Communication (SLOC) has always been central to Japanese policy makers. Section 
three explores the ambiguities inherent within the official Surrounding Areas 
narratives as signifying the emergence of a convenient rhetorical tool representing the 
shift in threat perception; and the fourth section analyses how policy makers use 
ambiguities to mean ‘what happens determines the location’. Such official narratives 
provide a rather sanitised view of Japan’s threat perception; but the various official 
rhetorical contortions provide a useful insight into Tokyo’s official worldviews and 
the associated Asia Imaginary. Put differently, there are apt to be subtle meanings 
inherent within such official lip-services: it means they warrant further inspection. 
The final section very briefly explores the prospects for further recalibration under the 
DPJ government.  
 
 
Recalibration of Threat Perception 
 
The emergence of Surrounding Areas narratives as a situational, rather than a 
geographical, term signifies a shift in Japan’s threat perception in response to 
international events. It involves an interplay of identity as a historical product, on the 
one hand; with the subjective nature of threat perception, on the other. Foreign policy 
pronouncements are tantamount to speech acts representing an actor’s worldviews 
addressing the perceived challenges in the international environment whereby inputs 
from exogenous factors reinforce an actor’s sense of Self in opposition to potentially 
dangerous Others. David Campbell (1998: 197) observes that state identity is a 
‘stylized repetition of practices’ constituting a feedback loop involving identity 
reconstruction along with external factors reinforcing collective worldviews and the 
language representing them. 
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 This cycle amounts to a macro-level reconstruction of institutional facts. Peter 
Berger and Thomas Luckmann (1966: 69-70) point out that ‘social order is a human 
product, or, more precisely, an ongoing human production. It is produced by man in 
the course of his ongoing externalization’. The end product of this process—an actor’s 
worldview—is fluid and flexible, and as John Searle (1995: 7) argues, ‘[s]ymbols do 
not create cats and dogs and evening stars; they create only the possibility of referring 
to cats, dogs, and evening stars in a publicly accessible way’. In the case of a state 
actor, the designation of neighbours as ‘friends’ or ‘foes’ is a social construction 
however much they seem ‘real’ to policy elites. Searle (1995: 96) adds that ‘the 
remarkable feature of institutional structures is that people continue to acknowledge 
and cooperate in many of them even when it is by no means obviously to their 
advantage to do so’. This means that anxieties manifest where actors engage in 
habituated relationships. This is the case since worldviews and ideas about the 
international environment leave the authorship of the authors to assume the lives of 
their own (Archer, 1995). As Margaret Archer (1995: 324) argues, ‘[w]hat we 
confront in daily life are, in fact, particular confirmations and what we meet and treat 
as amalgams are, in fact, specific forms of amalgamation’. Whenever new 
externalities emerge, they are met with anxiety—only for policies to be adjusted and 
new reality engaged. Japan experienced such change-versus-continuity nexus before. 
August 1945 meant ‘embracing defeat’ in order to rebuild a battered nation; but the 
continuity of Japanese Self across August 1945 became manifest through the 
forgetting of Japan’s atrocities in Asia, sowing the seeds of contemporary conflict and 
reinforcing the Japanese view—however ethnocentric—that Asia remains a hostile 
neighbourhood (Dower, 1998; Hicks, 1997; Buruma, 1994). 
The recalibration of threat perception takes place when the sense of Self is 
congealed and the perception of danger shifts as the international environment 
transforms, precipitating an evolution in the Self-Other dichotomy. Agents refine 
speech acts through the frame of reference provided by historically reinforced identity, 
while seeking to address the shifting images of the dangerous Otherness, however 
vague those threats may be (Roe, 2008). Jutta Weldes (1999: 10) posits that national 
interests are social constructions 
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created as meaningful objects out of which the intersubjective and culturally 
established meanings within which the world, particularly the international 
system and the place of the state in it, is understood. 
 
Collective memories and identities enable policy elites to share threat perceptions and 
the common language for addressing them. As Searle (1995: 24-25) argues, it is the 
act of ‘doing things together’ that fosters a sense of collective actorhood irreducible to 
a mere aggregation of individual attributes; and through this process, a dominant 
narrative of foreign policy emerges. 
 Given the fluid nature of institutional facts, there are apt to be contradictions. 
Actors might be socialised into expecting a certain outcome deriving from a familiar 
social interaction; but due to there being a constellation of external actors, unexpected 
outcomes emerge. As Searle (1995: 92) notes, ‘when institutions are maintained 
largely by habit, they can also collapse quite suddenly’. To be sure, not all changes 
occur suddenly. Anthony Giddens (1984: 198) points to the ‘fault lines’ in the 
structural constitution of societal systems lending themselves to a slower  
transformation in intersubjective structures. In Japanese foreign policy, various factors 
including: geographical constraints; the prevailing domestic identity narratives; and 
international political factors such as the rise of China and tensions in the Taiwan 
Strait and Korean Peninsula, delimit foreign policy choices available for Tokyo. 
Consequently, identity might shift from being a peace state jealously guarding Article 
9 of the Constitution to a pacifist state with ambitions to become a ‘normal state’ 
(futsu no kuni) ready to engage militarily under the auspices of the United Nations 
(Ozawa, 1995). The reiteration of pacifism might be a lip-service; but this also 
suggests that the signifier has become a rhetorical tool within which Japanese foreign 
policy is couched. 
People, as well as governments, come and go. But the institutionalised notion 
of Self and a generalised danger are inherited from one generation of policy makers to 
another. Colin Wight (2006: 296) argues that, 
 
Agential power in a social context is dependent upon structural positioning, 
but is not reducible to it. And social structures have a mode of being and a set 
of causal powers that are not reducible to the individuals upon whose activity 
they depend. 
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There are apt to be slippages between: (1) how one generation of policy makers 
within a particular international environment of the particular times reconstruct 
particular worldviews, on the one hand; and (2) the culture of diplomatic practices 
framing the narratives of Japan’s Asian existence, on the other. It is conceivable that 
the established Self/Other dichotomy within policy circles might shift with the 
relentlessly evolving international environment. Hence, reified worldviews confront 
international contexts encouraging policy makers to seek solutions from within the 
existing tool box available to them, namely the institutional practice. This process 
needs to be understood as an inevitable part of institutional life which entails 
recalibrations in the language of threat construction (Schiff, 2008: 363-77; Adler, 
2008). As Rafael Narvaez (2006: 66) suggests, collective memories act as a catalyst 
for not only looking back, but looking forward as well. Hidemi Suganami (2002: 29) 
adds that, 
 
Grounded in historically continuous collective consciousness, a state (an 
effective one) presents itself as a historical, societal, given—or reality—to all 
individuals inside and outside the state, even though it would be true to say 
that the state would not exist, or continue to do so, if no individual even held 
seriously the belief that it existed. 
 
Hence, the collective idea of Self has the potential to act as a template upon which 
future foreign policy decisions are framed. 
 New signifiers emerge from the process of threat recalibration; and this shift 
needs to be experienced by someone. We need to take account of a historically 
constructed collective identity that allows policy makers to not only experience and 
address external challenges, but also to bequeath such institutional experience from 
one generation to another. If we discount collective memory as an integral factor in 
the construction and recalibration of threat perception, then we fail to account for the 
vast library of knowledge that institutions possess. This is a reification of collective 
identity within the policy circles, but we need to take this process seriously because 
reification is also a social process. As Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper (2000: 
5) argue,  
 
Reification is a social process, not only an intellectual practice. As such, it is 
central to the politics of ‘ethnicity’, ‘race’, ‘nation’, and other putative 
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identities. Analysts of this kind of politics should seek to account for this 
process of reification. 
 
Again, it is tempting to treat Japan’s pacifism as a lip-service. Yet, it is also telling 
that Prime Minister Fukuda Yasuo reiterated Japan’s peace state narrative and 
regional imaginary in a May 2008 speech to the International Conference on the 
Future of Asia. In it, Fukuda argued that a new era (shin jidai) has arrived in which 
Japan, China, and South Korea share responsibility for the future of Asia and the 
wider world. He stated that, ‘Japan promises to work hard towards becoming an 
“International Peace Co-operating Country (heiwa kyoroku kokka)” to secure 
international peace in the Asia-Pacific region and the wider world’, adding that a new 
web of relationships in the region effectively shrinks the Pacific Ocean into a tighter 
mesh of pan-regional network similar in scope to the Mediterranean. 3 Even if it is a 
diplomatic nicety, this signifier reappears frequently in policy pronouncements to the 
effect that if we are to account for the ambiguities of Surrounding Areas, the 
deployment of such rhetorical devices needs to be take seriously. 
 
 
Japan’s Search for a Narrative 
 
The post-Cold War international environment, particularly after 9/11, compels Tokyo 
to search for a narrative that conforms to its participation in the so-called ‘War on 
Terror’. While the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) enthusiastically proclaims 
Japan’s status as a pacifist state having learned the lessons of the past, the Ministry of 
Defence (MOD; formerly Japan Defence Agency [JDA]), confirms Japan’s peaceful 
intentions only to argue that action is needed  to guarantee national security.4 Victor 
Cha (2000: 273) argues that the MSA ‘has become embedded in [Japan] to the extent 
that life without it is difficult to imagine’, bearing in mind that the Alliance constitutes 
another signifier of pacifist intentions. The adoption of New Guidelines is one such 
                                                 
3  Fukuda Yasuo, ‘Taiheiyo ga “nai-kai” to naru hi e’. 
<www.knatei.go.jp/jp/hukudaspeech/2008/05/22speech.html>. Accessed 23 May 2008. While it is easy 
to dismiss peace state narrative as a mere lip-service by the LDP government, it is worth noting that the 
LDP’s manifesto for July 2010 Upper House elections pledges to ‘preserve pacifism’, suggesting that 
the Party itself sees pacifism as a useful framework. See LDP, Jiminto seisaskushu: J-fairu (Manifesto) 
(LDP, 2010). 
4 MOFA, Gaiko seisho; and JDA/MOD, Nippon no boei, various issues. 
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recalibration exercise. Thomas Christiansen (1999: 58-59) argues that the previous 
1978 Guidelines were ‘viewed in the United States as lopsided and unfair because the 
United States guarantees Japanese security without clear guarantees of even 
rudimentary assistance from Japan if U.S. forces were to become embroiled in a 
regional armed conflict’. Superficially, the New Guidelines respond to such 
criticisms; but Japan’s incremental responsibility under the 1997 version can also be 
seen as an adjustment within the larger framework of the MSA in order for Tokyo to 
realign its sense of Self in response to newly emerging dangers. Reiterating the 
ambiguity of Surrounding Areas, Peter Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara (2001/02: 
171) point out that in ‘situations where rear-area support may be required, these areas 
are not necessarily limited to East Asia’, adding that ‘the scope of the areas 
surrounding Japan is variable and depends on a functional and conceptual, rather than 
a geographic and objective, construction of Japan’s changing security environment’ 
(172). 
Yet, pacifism as a post-war signifier of Japan that is distinct from its pre-war 
Self, involves a narrative feedback loop whereby it provides a backdrop against which 
international events are interpreted and Asian imaginary reformulated. Within the 
mainstream political establishment, pacifism does not preclude military capabilities; 
but rather, it entails a sensitive balancing act in seeking enhanced international 
political role for Japan while placating the neighbours. Even the MOD webpage states 
that its mission is to improve international security environment and pursue 
confidence-building through communication; and to encourage transparency between 
and among the various defence authorities.5 Thus, the policy narratives tend toward 
militarily contributing to international peace and security. Iriye Akira (1991: 211) 
argues that, 
 
Japan has so far decided not to go down the path of remilitarisation. This is 
because the domestic society and politics colluded in the emergence of public 
opinion in favour of economic restructuring rather than military revival…. But 
whether or not Japan will become a military superpower again depends on the 
existence of an international environment tolerant of such an adventure, 
meaning it is not just for the Japanese people to decide. 
 
                                                 
5 Ministry of Defence, <http://www.mod.go.jp/j/defense/exchange/index.html>. Accessed 13 March 
2008. 
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 To be sure, Japan’s pacifism is ‘not a monolithic concept’ (Izumikawa, 2010: 
125). As Yasuhiro Izumikawa (2010: 125) argues, it is an admixture of ‘pacifism, 
antitraditionalism, and the fear of entrapment’. Put differently, he posits that, 
 
In particular, pacifists’ manipulation of the fear of entrapment suggests that 
just as rational actors use norms to achieve their goals, normative agents seek 
to maximize the appeal of their ideals by incorporating realist factors into their 
strategies (126). 
 
For Izumikawa, pacifism derives mainly from left-leaning intellectuals; but the 
memories of suffering during the War provide a powerful ethical constraint against 
the use of force (129-30). As for antitraditionalism, it is another intellectual concept 
whereby the memories of militarism provide a strong incentive to ‘improve the 
quality of Japanese democracy’; and ‘security issues become relevant’ insofar as 
government accountability is concerned (130-31). Finally, the fear of entrapment 
denotes Tokyo’s unease at being potentially dragged into conflict as an American ally 
(131-32). Izumikawa employs these concepts to explain variations in Tokyo’s 
behaviour, including the 1960 MSA revision and Japan’s active involvement in the 
‘War on Terror’ under the Koizumi cabinet, suggesting that policy outcomes are 
determined by how pacifists frame debates, reiterating Sakamoto Yoshikazu’s 
argument that ‘the influence of Japanese pacifism derives from Japanese citizens’ 
desire to avoid being entrapped in an unwanted war that might be triggered by the 
United States’ (Izumikawa, 2010: 156-57). This partly explains Tokyo’s awkwardness 
in rationalising the US nuclear umbrella. Strong public opposition to nuclear weapons 
lend credence to Japan’s campaigning on nuclear non-proliferation as a hallmark of its 
pacifist inclination. However, this enthusiasm is tempered through alliance 
commitments, treating US nuclear arsenals as a necessary evil (Sato, 2010: 47-48). 
Hence, Japan’s collective sense of danger cohabitates with a fear of entrapment and 
the deployment of pacifist rhetoric as a default language; but the reality of its Asian 
existence translates into a fear of abandonment in response to the North Korean 
nuclear programme and the rise of China (Izumikawa, 2010: 158).    
Japan’s historical sense of alienation from Asia is another recurring theme in 
Japanese identity construction throughout the decades on both sides of August 1945, 
conflating the source of danger from both within and without its immediate 
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geographical periphery. 6  As such, the Korean Peninsula and Taiwan Strait—and 
hence China—are very much within Tokyo’s anxious gaze; but the so-called ‘War on 
Terror’ introduced an extra-Asian dimension to Japan’s security concerns. The 2005 
East Asian Strategic Review (Higashi Ajia senryaku gaikan) published by the 
National Institute for Defence Studies (NIDS) (2005: 205) reiterates this anxiety, 
noting that, 
 
It is impossible to address [the rise of international terrorism] using existing 
defence strategy alone, given the difficulty of prediction and evaluation. And 
once they occur, situation can deteriorate and spread rapidly. 
 
The National Defence Programme Outline (Taiko) of 2004 notes that this can only be 
augmented by reiterating Japan’s resolve to uphold its peace constitution—an 
assertion still repeated in the 2010 Taiko, despite its emphasis on perceived threat 
from China.7 Hence, just as Douglas MacArthur’s plan to construct a ‘Switzerland of 
the East’—an idealised state forgoing military involvement—was superseded by the 
reality of Korean War in 1950 and the larger context of the Cold War (Kusunoki, 
2006: 101), pacifism remains an ideal embedded in reality of Tokyo’s Asian, and the 
wider international, context. 
 
 
Asia in Japan’s Gaze 
 
The New Guidelines signed on 23 September 1997 signalled Tokyo’s willingness to 
enhance its international military involvement; and the deliberate ambiguity in 
delineating the defence perimeter effectively addressed the lessons of the 1991-92 
Gulf War fiasco during which Tokyo was criticised for its chequebook diplomacy. It 
was Tokyo’s effort to ‘show the world [that it is] no longer a chequebook diplomat 
but an engaged peacemaker’ (Financial Times, 21 January 2002: 9). The vagueness of 
Surrounding Areas justifies Japan’s military presence beyond the confines of Japan’s 
traditional sphere of interest in the Asia-Pacific in the hope of placating China, vis-à-
vis, the Taiwan Strait. In a sense, this marks a subtle evolution in Japan’s defence 
                                                 
6  For Japanese identity construction, see Miyoshi, 1991; Yoon, 1997; Drifte, 1998. 
7  See 2004 Taiko, Section III-1; and 2010 Taiko, Section II. 
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thinking. As Motoshi Suzuki (2010: 495) suggests, the Yoshida Doctrine ‘served as 
Japan’s post-war grand strategy to promote security and prosperity within the 
constraints of the war-renouncing Constitution and the difficult economic conditions 
[of the 1950s]’. Yet, by the time Nakasone Yasuhiro became prime minister, the focus 
shifted towards ‘revitalising’ Japan while admitting to Japan’s war time atrocities 
(Watanabe, 2007: 138). Part of the solution was to adopt kokuren chushin shugi (UN-
centrism) in the 1990s as a way to address both the changes in demands from the 
international community, while satiating Japan’s appetite in addressing such concerns 
(Bergström, 1999: 174). As such, while Tokyo seeks to satisfy its international 
ambition, anxieties about the role of China remain; and that it will always be 
concerned about managing its alliance relationship with the US (Kingston, 2011: 140). 
Hence, Asia as a potentially hostile entity remains an anchorage upon which Japan 
determines its international posture. 
 
 
Change and Continuity in Japan’s Asia Imaginary 
 
Japan’s reified image of Asia as a hostile neighbourhood is a historical construct. 
Euan Graham (2006: ch. 3) observes that the brute fact of Japan’s geography instils a 
sense of vulnerability, whether be it an invasion of the homeland via the Korean 
Peninsula or through the blockade of SLOC to the south. This explains both the 
contemporary threat perception and the concerns of Meiji oligarchs during the late 
19th century: for Japanese policy makers throughout the centuries, Asia has been an 
opportunity as well as a source of anxiety (Duus, 1995: 20-21). Maruyama Masao 
(1961: 9-10) argues that kaikoku (the opening) after 1853 marked Japan’s exposure to 
the Realpolitik of imperial powers; and Masao Miyoshi (1996: 186) suggests that this 
precipitated the emergence of a worldview through which Japan felt it had no choice 
but to embark upon its own programme of semi-colonialism.  
 The 1890s saw Field Marshal Yamagata Aritomo identify the ‘cordons of 
sovereignty and interest’. Iriye (1966: 30-31) notes that the ‘cordon of sovereignty’ 
referred to the Japanese territory itself, while the ‘cordon of interest’ remained an 
‘ambiguous, and a tautological, concept’ prescribing a defence periphery necessary 
for the security of the homeland. Peter Duus (1995: 17) argues that ‘the “cordon of 
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interest” included the weaker neighboring countries that might become the object of 
Western imperialist aggression’ unless Japan took steps to pre-empt it. Consequently, 
Japan’s aggression towards Asia was justified domestically as necessary for national 
security (Najita and Harootunian, 1998: 212), constructing Asia as an object of desire, 
as well as a signifier reminding pre-war policy makers of Japan’s purported 
uniqueness as the sole Asian power capable of standing up to the West. By the mid-
1930s, Tokyo felt that the conflict with the West over Asia became inevitable (Iriye, 
1966: 107-13); and the idea of Greater Far Eastern Co-prosperity Sphere emerged in 
an effort at consolidating Asian coalition against the West. Once the periphery was 
understood to be weak and vulnerable, Tokyo decided that the only recourse to 
defending the homeland was for Japan to preside over the rest of Asia (Ito, 1998). 
Tokyo realised that Asia and its vulnerability constituted a source of insecurity, 
legitimising its self-proclaimed, ethno-centric, role as a ‘liberator’, alter-casting Asia 
as an Otherness against which the Japanese Self needed protection. 
 Japan’s defeat in the Second World War marked a significant psychological 
rupture. John Dower (1999: 24) argues that the post-war occupiers ‘encountered a 
populace sick of war, contemptuous of the militarists who had led them to disaster, 
and all but overwhelmed by difficulties of the present circumstance in a ruined land’. 
Yet, a further inspection also reveals that the emergent pacifism failed to reject 
military role for Japan. Indeed, the Cold War gave the impression that threat to 
national existence remained; and Japan’s decision to outsource defence to the US, 
thereby allowing itself to focus on reconstruction, enabled post-war generations of 
policy makers to maintain Japan’s pacifist demeanour before embarking upon gradual 
remilitarisation (Chai, 1997). For Jeff Kingston (2011: 131), the sense of ‘living in a 
dangerous neighborhood with unpredictable neighbors has created opportunities in 
Japan for advocates of enhanced security capabilities to achieve their long-standing 
agendas’. Prime Minister Abe Shinzo proposed changes to the Constitution, arguing 
that it was a diktat (oshitsuke kempo); but Watanabe Osamu (2007: 138-39) cautions 
that, unlike Nakasone’s nationalism, it lacked any sense of recompense towards the 
past. Indeed, Kingston (2011: 132) suggests that the ‘public backlash [to his proposal] 
was unexpectedly strong’. Similar backlash was witnessed by the Sato cabinet in the 
1960s when the then-prime minister admitted that the Korean Peninsula fell within 
Japan’s defence periphery precipitating a media uproar (Watanabe, 2010: 19). Hence, 
the obscuring of ‘definitional lines between Article 5 and Article 6 missions [under 
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the MSA] between “defensive defense” and “collective self-defense” under Japan’s 
basic defense posture’ (Kingston, 2011: 132) became the only viable narrative 
through which Tokyo was able to address changes in the international system. As 
such, pacifism acts as a convenient narrative signifying rupture from the pre-war Self 
while constituting an integral part of the language of post-war foreign policy 
(Katzenstein, 1996). 
 The outsourcing of defence also signified the resilience of Japan’s perception 
that Asia continues to be a dangerous neighbourhood. The continuity of this 
psychological milieu derives primarily from geopolitical constraints; but it is further 
sustained by an organic continuity in the form of military personnel whose 
experiences and threat perceptions from the War were deemed necessary in preparing 
Japan to confront post-war defence challenges. As Graham (2006: 98-99) argues, 
 
the [Maritime Self Defence Forces (MSDF)] was a direct descendant of the 
Imperial Navy, retaining many of its personnel, as well as its customs, 
traditions and institutional forms. As part of this, the MSDF also inherited the 
ambitions of those whose ‘beautiful dream’ was to restore Japan’s post-war 
navy to a fully fledged stand-alone force whose mission would be to defend 
Japan’s SLOC…. The presence of Imperial Navy veterans at all key levels of 
the fledgling MSDF also ensured that the institutional memory of the wartime 
blockade was passed on. 
 
To be sure, Japan’s post-war worldview and policy orientation entail 
significant US input. As Qingxin Ken Wang (2003: 112) argues, Japanese 
ambivalence in maintaining its pacifist narrative while simultaneously enjoying the 
protection under the US nuclear umbrella is a product of socialisation between Tokyo 
and Washington (ibid.). He suggests that, 
 
It was the deliberate American and Japanese policies and the external events 
caused intentionally or unintentionally by the United States, such as the 
occupation of Japan, the 1960 security treaty crisis, and Japan’s rapid 
economic growth that have led to the emergence of the new Japanese security 
culture and the resultant dominance of pro-American centrists both inside and 
outside the LDP. 
 
The Sino-American standoff in the Taiwan Strait in 1995-96 following the Taiwanese 
presidential election, along with the North Korean nuclear issue ‘paved the way for 
intense intra-alliance communication for perceptive convergence, with a specific 
 14
reminder to Japanese officials that regional peace and stability were no better 
guaranteed in the post-Cold War than in the Cold War itself’ (Suzuki, 2010: 502). The 
October 2000 Armitage Report urged Tokyo and Washington to ‘develop a “common 
perception and approach” to their relationship’ (McDougall, 2007: 108). It is within 
this post-war context that the narratives of Surrounding Areas restate Japan’s 
geographical predisposition and the notion that the country’s destiny is determined by 
events largely within the Asia-Pacific region but not necessarily confined to it. The 
2009 edition of the Strategic Review (NIDS, 2009: 243-45) states that the SLOC links 
the Middle East with Japan’s immediate neighbourhood, while regional conflicts and 
weapons of mass destruction cannot be defined by geography alone. It recognises that 
Asia remains a significant factor in Japan’s threat perception, although the post-9/11 
era suggests that the dangers are more diffuse. 
 Japanese identity has always been oscillating between Japan that is firmly 
located in Asia as a geographical location, yet sentimentally distinct from it as a 
notional entity (Yoon, 1997; Koshiro, 1999). The image of Asia as a perceived source 
of threat has been reified as a reality against which Japan’s national security 
calculations are based. According to the MOD, the MSA functions to guarantee 
Japanese sovereignty and facilitates in maintaining peace and stability in the Far East. 
Furthermore, it argues that the close co-operation between Japan and the US 
contributes towards the peace and stability of the Surrounding Areas, and is 
indispensable even after the end of the Cold War. 8  The uncertainties of future 
regional developments, coupled with the certainty of dangers inherent within Japan’s 
neighbourhood, help frame the ambiguities of the Surrounding Areas. The 
‘Introduction’ to the 2007 edition of the Strategic Review (NIDS, 2007: i) suggests 
that ‘the maintenance of peace and stability in East Asia entails an objective 
understanding of the region’s security environment’. Despite its prescription for an 
objective understanding (kyakkan-teki na rikai), the Strategic Review represents the 
fusion of geographical certainties with the uncertainties of where the threats are, and 
how they manifest themselves. 
 Superficially, the evolving language of Japan’s defence periphery from the Far 
East to Surrounding Areas is a significant transformation in nomenclature and 
sentiment. The language of Surrounding Areas allows for flexibility, while the new 
                                                 
8  MOD Website, ‘Nichibei anzen hosho’. 
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psychological landscape calls for enhanced Japanese involvement worldwide. While 
change must not be over-played given the resilience of Japan’s reified geographical 
imaginary, it must not be trivialised either since the additional flexibility to the 
language of Japan’s threat perception suggests that policy elites in Tokyo recognise 
dangers that were previously unarticulated. The 2009 Strategic Review (NIDS, 2009: 
239-40) sums up well: 
 
 The change of language from ‘international contribution’ (kokusai koken) to 
 ‘international co-operation’ (kokusai heiwa kyoryoku katsudo) marks a change 
 in attitude. While ‘kokusai koken’ seems to signify Japan that is taking a ‘step 
 back’ as a spectator, ‘kokusai heiwa kyoryoku katsudo’ implies Japan’s 
 willingness to partake in international activities. Given the process of 
 globalisation, distant events can potentially threaten Japan’s security. To that 
 extent, it is imperative that Japan proactively responds to them as though if the 
 country is directly affected by such events. 
  
 Determining whether this change is the result of meticulous calculation or 
whether it is borne of events superseding domestic policy discussions remains 
difficult. However, the ambiguities of the official narratives represent Japanese policy 
makers rationalising exogenous factors such as US pressures and the rise of China. 
 
 
Surrounding Areas as a New Language 
 
The New Guidelines reiterate Japan’s historically constructed threat perception 
alluding to the familiar symbols of post-war Japanese national identity—a language 
that invokes revised MSA of 1960 and other defence-related pronouncements. MSA 
states that the intention of both the US and Japan is to ‘uphold the aims and principles 
of the United Nations Charter in wishing to cohabitate peacefully with all the peoples 
and governments’ along with the desire to ‘maintain international peace and security 
of the Far East’ (the Preamble). At the same time, Article 4 states that ‘the State 
Parties agree to regularly consult one another in the implementation of this Treaty; 
and when a threat to Japan’s security, or threats to peace and security of the Far East, 
emerge, then either of the State Parties can demand consultation’. 
 The MOD seeks to reassure the public of its peaceful intentions. Its website 
suggests that peace and security cannot simply be wished: they must be realised 
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through multiple channels including diplomacy and economic interdependence. 
Reference is made to Japan’s predicament as a resource-poor country dependent on 
imports, emphasising the need to foster international peace and harmony (kyocho).9 
Pacifism is enunciated further as the constitutional constraints are addressed. The 
various issues of the Defence White Paper, the Defence of Japan (Nippon no boei) 
follow a pre-defined format in delineating Japan’s defence policy. They begin by 
invoking the lessons of the War (JDA, 1997: 128; 2000: 66; 2005: 79), followed by 
employing pacifism to justify maintaining the SDF under the 1947 Constitution. For 
instance, the 1997 edition (JDA, 1997: 130) talks of the nation’s ‘efforts at 
constructing a peaceful state’, while the 2000 edition (JDA, 2000: 67) identifies 
pacifism (heiwa shugi) as a constitutional principle, and the 2004 issue (JDA, 2004: 
78) reaffirms Japan as a peace state (heiwa kokka). In its webpage, the MOD stresses 
the tragic memories of the War as a psychological backdrop for post-war Japan; but 
justifies the existence of SDF, vis-à-vis Article 9, by invoking the inherent right of 
self-defence as a sovereign state,10 emphasising that the MSA forms the ‘basis for 
Japanese diplomacy’ and a ‘valuable asset in its contribution to international peace 
and stability’.11 Hence, the pacifist narrative is amalgamated with the MSA to justify 
military role for a pacifist state.    
 Duality in Japan’s security interests reappears in the New Guidelines. On the 
one hand, the narratives of pacifism are apparent. Section II, Paragraph 2, reiterates 
constitutional constraints as the framework for policy construction; and in Section III, 
Paragraph 3, the US-Japan alliance is depicted as a crucial ingredient in guaranteeing 
a stable international security environment. On the other hand, it introduces the 
concept of Surrounding Areas. For instance, Section IV, Paragraph 1, states that the 
alliance will bear in mind that ‘depending on the developments in the surrounding 
areas, both the Japanese and American governments will maintain close co-operation’ 
in contemplating counter-measures. Once the present and clear danger is identified, 
the SDF ‘will initiate defensive action primarily within Japanese territory and the 
surrounding waters and airspace’, while the US forces provide support (Sec. IV, Para. 
2, 1 [ro]). With respect to the protection of shipping, it states that both the SDF and 
                                                 
9  MOD, ‘Waga kuni no anzen hosho’, <www.mod.go.jp/defense/policy/seisaku/kihon01.htm>. 
Accessed 26 June 2008. 
10  MOD, ‘Kenpo to jieitai’, <www.mod.go.jp/defense/policy/seisaku/kihon02.htm>. Accessed 26 June 
2008. 
11   MOD, ‘Nichi-bei anzen hosho taisei no igi’, 
<www.mod.go.jp/defense/policy/seisaku/anzen01.htm>. Accessed 26 June 2008. 
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the US Navy ‘will conduct joint operations necessary for the defence of the 
surrounding seas and the protection of maritime transport’, adding that the main task 
for the SDF will be ‘to defend major ports and channels, along with the surrounding 
seas’ (Sec. IV, Para. 2, 2 [ro]). 
 The New Guidelines reiterate an earlier working paper. The joint US-Japan 
committee discussing the revision met in Honolulu in June 1997 producing an interim 
report. It begins with a reference to Japan’s constitutional constraints (Sec. III, Para. 
2) as defining Japan’s defence capability. It also refrains from delineating the defence 
perimeter, and instead, introduced the term Surrounding Areas in Section IV, 
Paragraph 1(4), noting that ‘the Japanese and American governments shall foster the 
basis for defence co-operation conducive to effectively supporting military actions 
aimed at [defending] Japan and its surrounding areas’. Moreover, it argues that 
‘should circumstances in surrounding areas entail assessments identifying imminent 
military threat to Japan’, the allies will co-operate in preparing counter-measures (Sec. 
IV, Para. 2 [1]). 
 Hence, Surrounding Areas emerged as a new language for addressing Japan’s 
anxieties. On the one hand, it seems that the Far East as a signifier for potential threats 
remains relevant. Japan is growing ever more anxious of China, while remaining 
reluctant to define Taiwan Strait as a source of nervousness (Mori: 2006: 138-41). On 
the other hand, Tokyo is under pressure to pursue new international roles. So long as 
the MSA remains the foundation for Japanese defence posture, Asia or Far East 
remain a reified entity that Tokyo sees as a source insecurity; while the nature of 
threat evolves as Japanese policy makers realise there are dangers lurking behind the 
familiar, traditional, geographical confines. As such, the ambiguities in the language 
of Surrounding Areas address Japan’s foreign policy anxieties, while simultaneously 
limiting the potential damage to Tokyo’s relations with Beijing. 
 
 
Ambiguities as a Language of Recalibration 
 
The official narratives of Surrounding Areas combine the evolving contemporary 
threat perception with the historical appreciation of Japan’s geographical vulnerability. 
Peter Katzenstein (1996: 148) argues that pacifism constrains Japan’s strategic 
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considerations by placing ‘great obstacles in the path of those who want to make 
Japan a normal country, with a normal military force and normal levels of military 
spending; the government’s room for maneuver has been much smaller for external 
than for internal security policy’. The cohabitation of an assertion by the JDA/MOD 
regarding Japan’s peaceful intentions, on the one hand; and MOFA’s emphasis on 
pacifism, on the other is telling. The JDA/MOD recognises the necessity of reiterating 
the peace state narrative, arguing that SDF is a minimum requirement in guaranteeing 
national security while lending credence to pacifist claims (JDA, 2006: 74-75). 
Meanwhile, MOFA (2006: 2) seized on the 60th anniversary of the end of the war to 
devote one section of its 2006 Diplomatic Blue Book (Gaiko seisho) to emphasise 
pacifism, stating that, ‘from the ashes of defeat, the Japanese nation pledged to build a 
peaceful and prosperous country (heiwa de yutaka na kuni)’. It suggests that Japan 
should never be complacent as a ‘pacifist state’ (heiwa kokka), pointing out the 
government’s efforts within the UN framework (3); and that its international 
contributions confer legitimacy to ‘Japan as a pacifist state’ (heiwa kokka Nippon) (4-
5). Ambiguities became prominent once the certainties of Cold War were superseded 
by the uncertainties of post-Cold War environment. Both exogenous- and endogenous 
factors conspire to reinforce the perception of international environment as an 
awkward new reality for Tokyo. Externally, while the Soviet threat subsided, a new 
threat in the form of North Korean nuclear weapons emerged. Moreover, the spectre 
of Gulf War fiasco remained; and despite the US involvement over Korean Peninsula, 
and therefore, the implications for alliance commitment, Tokyo ‘insisted that it would 
not carry out sanctions against the North without a UNSC resolution authorizing the 
sanctions’ (Yahuda, 2011: 319). This precipitated a perception gap between the US 
and Japan in which Washington considered Japan to be a ‘free-rider’, while Tokyo 
feared entrapment. Tanaka Akihiko (2010: 38) adds that, by 1994, Tokyo realised the 
inadequacy of the legal framework stipulating American bases on Japan and Tokyo’s 
ability to provide assistance. This sense of ‘drift’ in alliance ‘led to its revamping’ 
(Yahuda, 2011: 319); and Japan’s enhanced international military involvement was 
considered essential in highlighting Tokyo’s continued commitment to the alliance, 
particularly following the heightened sense of emergency on the Korean Peninsula 
(Tanaka, 2010: 38). 
Domestically, too, there was a shift in Japan’s defence posture. According to 
Chijiwa Yasuyuki (2008: 72-73), the policy makers’ understanding that Japan needs 
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to reinforce its international role translated into an idea that it is crucial to prevent 
Japan from becoming a ‘power vacuum’ by maintaining minimum deterrence 
capabilities. Furthermore, Fujishige Hiromi (2008: 106-07) suggests that public 
opinion polls conducted by the Cabinet Office in 1994 indicated that the proportion of 
respondents who feared Japan would be drawn into a conflict was 44 per cent; but in 
1997, it rose to 55 per cent, and by 2000, the figure was 65 per cent. Fujishige (ibid.) 
notes that the result for 1997 is striking given the absence of an existential threat in 
1997 that was comparable to 1994 at the height of the North Korean nuclear crisis. 
She suggests that ‘those who felt that the security environment has deteriorated’ grew 
in number throughout the 1990s (ibid.), indicating that a shift in Japan’s security 
concerns entailed reconstruction in the language of threat perception. Here again, the 
geographical realities defining Japan’s perceived vulnerabilities collided with the 
constraints of alliance commitments. 
It was within these international and domestic contexts that the official 
narratives of Surrounding Areas emerged. The April 1996 meeting between President 
Bill Clinton and Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryutaro sought to review the 1978 
Guidelines, ‘reaffirming the MSA as the basis upon which both the US and Japan seek 
to maintain peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region into the 21st Century’ 
(Tanaka, 1997: 344). Superficially, the communiqué was a re-statement of the MSA: 
the Asia-Pacific region remained squarely within Japan’s gaze and Japan was to 
remain under the US nuclear umbrella. Yet, Tokyo was urged to enhance its military 
role, as well as expanding the regional scope of its defence periphery. The statement 
clarified the need to maintain peace and stability, but it remained vague: the Soviet 
Union disintegrated while China was emerging as a major military power, and Taiwan 
remained a taboo. This was underlined in the 1995 Taiko which concluded that a 
large-scale military conflict was highly unlikely following the end of the Cold War, 
but the possibility of small-scale military conflicts in the Surrounding Areas 
persisted.12 
 The absence of a clear geographical delineation within the evolving official 
discourse also suggests that Tokyo is cognisant of the potential for any danger to 
emerge anywhere. The challenge of reconciling emergent threats in an unfamiliar 
international setting perceived through the familiar geographical worldview provides 
                                                 
12  MOD, Boei taiko kaisetsu (1995). <wwwmod.go.jp/j/defense/policy/taikou/kaisetsu/index.html>. 
Accessed 26 June 2008. 
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a fertile ground upon which the Surrounding Areas narratives remain obscure. As 
Graham (2006: 5) argues,  
 
The elastic spatial definition of sea lanes also gave supporters of an extra-
territorial defence role for the MSDF and Air Self Defence Force (ASDF) the 
flexibility to expand the geographical boundaries of Japan’s self-defence zone 
without directly confronting the proscriptions against overseas dispatch and 
collective self-defence, which have constrained where, how and with whom 
the SDF can operate. 
 
The official documents take for granted this vagueness as if the meanings and 
implications are self-evident. Graham (2006: 182) describes the New Guidelines as an 
exercise in ambiguity, observing that, 
 
in a departure from the original [1978 Guidelines], approximately 40 new 
‘rear-area’ joint operational tasks applying to ‘situations in area surrounding 
Japan’ were deemed permissible under Japan’s interpretation of the right of 
self-defence, 
 
adding: 
 
Attempts to delimit the scope of the Guidelines geographically are dropped in 
favour of a vague formula to minimize controversy, whereby the Guidelines 
would apply ‘in situations and areas surrounding Japan’, and at the same time 
preserving ambiguity over whether Japan would assist US efforts to repel 
Chinese aggression across the [Taiwan] strait (212). 
 
 The 1995 Taiko maintains this vagueness. Sado Akihiro suggests that a 
changing international environment facilitated a transformation in Japan’s 
international role. Crises in the Korean Peninsula and Taiwan Strait, along with ‘new 
threats’ emerging in the post-9/11 international environment, compelled Japan to 
forge closer co-operation with the US (Sado, 2007: 193). Within the MOD briefing 
document,13  Asia remains a conceptual focus (Sec. I-1), along with geographical 
indicators such as Russia, the Far East, and the Korean Peninsula (Sec.II-3). There is 
also a familiar refrain that the end of the Cold War exposes ethnic and religious 
conflicts as destabilising factors in the international environment (Sec. II-3), 
acknowledging the need to countenance terrorist threats and to establish a legal 
                                                 
13 MOD, Boei taiko kaisetsu. <www.mod.go.jp/j/defense/policy/taikou/kaisetsu/index.html>. Accessed 
26 June 2008. 
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framework to minimise the risks to peace and stability in the Surrounding Areas (Sec. 
II-3-3-2). 
The June 1997 agreement between Tokyo and Washington reviewing the 1978 
Guidelines14  also remains silent on the geographical confines of Japan’s military 
involvement, only to suggest that the US and Japan will ‘gather information when the 
situation changes’ (Sec. IV, Para. 2 [1]). Likewise, the New Guidelines do not provide 
a definition: they reiterate Surrounding Areas throughout the document as if they were 
self-evident. Section IV, Paragraph 1, casually states that the allies will ‘respond to 
changing events’ when ‘an attack against Japan is imminent’. Here, the New 
Guidelines take for granted that the Surrounding Areas adequately address the new 
dangers for Japan. This is particularly striking given that, in Paragraph II, they refer to 
the MSA as the guiding principle, when the latter defines Japan’s defence periphery to 
be the Far East (kyokuto)(Preamble of the MSA).15 Collectively, both the 1995 Taiko 
and the New Guidelines represent Tokyo’s anxieties within the changing 
psychological landscape. 
 
 
The Far East, the Asia-Pacific, and Surrounding Areas 
 
The narratives of Surrounding Areas are not only ambiguous, but in comparing and 
contrasting the MSA with the New Guidelines, the Far East as a regional signifier is 
now interspersed with other regional symbols—the Asia-Pacific and Surrounding 
Areas. The 1978 Guidelines considered invasion of Japan as a prominent threat, along 
with the wider security concerns in the Far East (Tanaka, 1997: 284). Two years 
before that, the 1976 Taiko reiterated Tokyo’s realisation that ‘while there seems to be 
a balance of power between the Soviet Union and China, there are new threats 
emanating from the Korean Peninsula, and that we need to be mindful of military 
developments in the neighbouring states’ (Iriye, 1991: 165). But by the April 1996 
summit, the Far East became just one of many signifiers denoting Japan’s 
                                                 
14 MOD, Nichibei boei-kyoryoku no tame no shishin no minaoshi ni kansuru chukan torimatome, 7 
June 1997. <www.mod.go.jp/j/defense/policy/anpo/sisin97/interim/interim.htm>. Accessed 28 
September 2007. 
15  MOD, Nippon-koku to Amerika gasshu-koku to no aida no sogo-kyoryoku oyobi anzen-shosho 
joyaku, 23 June 1960. <www.mod.go.jp/j/library/treaty/anpo/anpo.html>. Accessed 22 January 2008. 
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vulnerability. In Section 3 titled ‘The Regional Outlook’, their joint declaration states 
that: 
 
Since the end of the Cold War, the possibility of global armed conflict has 
receded. The last few years have seen expanded political and security dialogue 
among countries in the region. Respect for democratic principles is growing. 
Prosperity is more widespread than at any time in history, and we are 
witnessing the emergence of an Asia-Pacific community. The Asia-Pacific 
region has become the most dynamic area of the globe. 
 At the same time, instability and uncertainty persist in the region. 
Tensions continue on the Korean Peninsula. There are still heavy 
concentrations of military force, including nuclear arsenals. Unresolved 
territorial disputes, potential regional conflicts, and the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery all constitute sources 
of instability (Hook, et al., 2001: 476-77). 
 
Here, we can identify several geographical signifiers: the ‘Asia-Pacific’; the 
‘countries in the region’; and the ‘Korean Peninsula’. Simultaneously, the recognition 
that the developments in ‘the weapons of mass destruction and their means of 
delivery’ imply that the ‘sources of instability’ are omnipresent, to the extent that a 
flexible delineation of Japan’s defence perimeter is seen as an imperative. 
 This ambiguity survives within the narratives of New Guidelines and beyond, 
with Tokyo’s sensitivities toward Beijing reflected in the triumvirate of under-defined 
regional designators. The 1997 edition of the Defence of Japan (JDA, 1997: 101-2) 
suggests that the ‘Asia-Pacific is different from Europe’ and ‘for the security of our 
country, events in the surrounding areas need to be stable’. It refers to MSA as a tool 
for peace and stability in the Far East; but also points out that the alliance is crucial to 
‘maintaining peace and stability in areas surrounding our country’ (145). The 1998 
issue (JDA, 1998: 103) follows the basic framework, referring to Surrounding Areas 
as implying a situational concept that addresses security within the international 
environment, but specifically refers to the Far East within the context of MSA (104-5). 
But in reference to the 1996 communiqué, both the 1997 and 1998 editions revert to 
the Asia-Pacific as a regional signifier for US-Japan co-operation into the 21st century 
(JDA, 1997: 147; 1998, 106-7). Subsequent issues maintain this format, juggling the 
Far East, the Asia-Pacific, and Surrounding Areas to describe the various aspects of 
activities under the alliance. The 2002 edition (JDA, 2002: 84) refers to ‘new dangers’ 
(aratana kiken) in the wake of 9/11 attacks; but states that such dangers are present in 
the Asia-Pacific region as well (JDA, 2002: 89). Its discussion of Japan’s enhanced 
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obligations under the New Guidelines points to the security of the Far East under 
Article 6 of the MSA; but argues that the close co-operation between Tokyo and 
Washington enhances the security of Surrounding Areas in order to maintain peace 
and stability in the Asia-Pacific (90-92). 
 Hence, the official narratives of Surrounding Areas denote ambiguities within 
Japan’s own deliberations of its defence periphery: it is the Far East in reference to the 
MSA, but becomes the Asia-Pacific once the attention turns to enhanced co-operation. 
Yet, the addition of ‘new dangers’, not to mention further pressures from the US, 
necessitates a switch to the language of Surrounding Areas. Furthermore, this helps to 
obscure Tokyo’s concern over the Taiwan Strait, vis-à-vis Beijing, presenting an 
additional incentive to frame future foreign policy considerations in a situational, 
rather than a geographical, language. 
 
 
What Happens Determines the Location 
 
Policy makers insist that Surrounding Areas are a situational term rather than a 
geographical one. The cohabitation of the Far East, the Asia-Pacific, and Surrounding 
Areas in the JDA/MOD documents suggests that geography matters and situational 
anxieties are prevalent. Yokota Koichi (1997: 52-53) argues that geographical 
ambiguities are not new: the February 1960 interpretation by MOFA insists that the 
term, Far East, is ‘not proven geographically’ but both Japan and the US are 
‘interested (kanshin no mato) in the areas surrounding Japan, including South Korea 
and areas under the jurisdiction of the Republic of China’. Yokota adds that the 
proliferation of the phrase, the Asia-Pacific, within the 1996 Communiqué implies an 
area wider than the Far East but distinct from Surrounding Areas (54-55). Hence, the 
more we try to define Surrounding Areas, let alone the Far East and the Asia-Pacific, 
the less clear they become. 
Perhaps it is Japan’s Asian anxieties that obscure the boundaries of various 
regional narratives. East Asian Strategic Reviews represent official willingness on the 
part of Japan to engage more pro-actively in its own defence as well as in the 
Surrounding Areas. The 2003 Strategic Review (NIDS, 2003: 2) argues that the so-
called ‘War on Terror’ entails knowledge of information technology and finance, such 
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that ‘victory depends on maintaining international co-operation’; and that the Cold 
War mentality of forward deployment (zenpo yokushi taisei) ‘maintaining armed 
forces only in Western Europe and Northeast Asia is inadequate in responding to 
potentials for conflicts in various regions’ (215-16). It then questions the nature of 
contemporary threats: what kinds of threats exist; where they are located; and how to 
anticipate them (218). The 2004 edition argues that the efficacy of the MSA improved 
following the passage of The Surrounding Areas Act of 200016 in guaranteeing co-
operation in situations adversely affecting the peace and security of Japan and its 
surrounding areas (NIDS, 2004: 207). 
Here again, the emergence of the situational term to symbolise Japan’s threat 
perception and the concomitant need to show Tokyo’s willingness to enhance its 
international involvement derives from an admixture of external- and domestic factors. 
The memories of the Gulf War fiasco made it an imperative to react proactively to 
international crises following 9/11. The terrorist attacks provided the extra momentum 
for Tokyo to reassert its international commitment. Shinoda Tomohito (2010: 26) 
notes that, already on 19 September 2001, the government outlined seven steps in 
response to the attacks, including its readiness to deploy naval vessels for 
reconnaissance, as well as preparing to facilitate humanitarian and economic 
assistance in the surrounding areas. Furthermore, Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro 
visited Washington on 25 September, promising to co-operate with the US forces 
(ibid.). Shinoda (2010: 26) also states that the Diet passed a series of anti-terrorist 
legislations by 29 October, with the Chief Cabinet Secretary Fukuda Yasuo 
suggesting that ‘the memories of the Gulf War were vivid in the minds of the 
government and the ruling party. The Liberal Democratic Party [LDP] felt it 
necessary to pass these bills quickly’. Hence, the anti-terrorist legislations were in 
place by November 2001; and throughout 2003, Tokyo made it possible for the SDF 
to partake in the Iraq War, culminating in the deployment of Ground SDF to Iraq in 
January 2004 (Tanaka, 2010: 39). Thus, Japanese policy makers felt the pressure to 
respond positively this time round; and in doing so, the recalibration of Japan’s 
defence perimeters became necessary as well. 
The 2004 Taiko and Mid-term Defence Programme (Chukibo) reflect this 
evolving perception. Taiko identifies 9/11 as symptomatic of newly emerging threats 
                                                 
16 The Act—Shuhen-jitai anzen-kakuho ho—is designed to implement the New Guidelines.  
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(Sec. II); and while the degree of interdependence increased after the Cold War, 
uncertainties remain in the Korean Peninsula and Taiwan Strait (Sec. II-2). It argues 
that Japan has maintained minimum armaments in order to prevent power vacuum 
from developing in the Surrounding Areas (Sec. III-2-3). While the Korean Peninsula, 
Taiwan Strait, and the Asia-Pacific region are all mentioned, Taiko is nevertheless 
nebulous on geographical designators (Sec. III-3). The non-definition continues with 
the proclamation of Japan’s ‘geographical uniqueness’ (chiri-teki tokusei) that 
demands flexible deployment of military capabilities (Sec. IV-1-1). Chukibo 
elaborates on the uncertainties, arguing that the new threats and fluid situations call 
for flexibility (Sec. I, Para. 1) in order ‘to take note of developments in the 
surrounding areas’ (Sec. III-2). The 2005 edition (NIDS, 2005: 2-3) reiterates the 
inherent uncertainties of the post-9/11 world and the potentials for instability within 
the Asia-Pacific region, suggesting that danger is everywhere. It further admits that 
the SDF, as they stand, are inadequate in tackling international terrorism (205-6), 
arguing that the previous geographical definition of Japan’s vulnerability is a product 
of the Cold War; and that it is incapable of addressing the fluid nature of 
contemporary threats—the wide-ranging potential dangers ranging from North Korea 
to guerrilla warfare (207). The 2006 edition (NIDS, 2006: 8) argues that globalisation 
compels international co-operation in order to ‘eliminate potential and underlying 
threats’; and while there is a diminished overall threat in the shape of territorial 
invasion, such consideration is superseded by ‘new forms of threats’ in ‘multifarious 
situations’ (220-26). The uncertainties of an unclear, yet omnipresent, dangers are 
exacerbated with the US plans to transform American troops around the world. The 
2007 edition (NIDS, 2007: 6) illustrates this concern, stating that ‘the Bush 
administration has not enunciated its East Asian strategy, but its basic approach is to 
tackle global security issues through alliances’. Chapter eight of the edition is titled, 
‘Responding to a Liquid Security Environment’, reiterating Japan’s concern over the 
US deployment and its implications in addressing the unknowns (243-45). 
Strategists seem comfortable in emphasising the fluid nature of new threats 
represented through the concept of Surrounding Areas, while politicians and 
bureaucrats seem discomfited. Following the 1996 Taiko, Chief Cabinet Secretary 
Nosaka Koken stated that Surrounding Areas do not alter MOFA’s February 1960 
interpretation of the Far East (Koike and Maeda, 2007: 221). In response to MP Ikeda 
Katsuya’s confusion over Surrounding Areas, Foreign Minister Ikeda Yukihiko stated 
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in February 1996 that the Far East is a term used in the MSA, while the Asia-Pacific 
encompasses ‘wider areas surrounding the Far East’, adding that Surrounding Areas 
‘are not interchangeable with particular states, but the concept needs to be assessed 
according to situations that might affect our peace and stability’ (223-24). Responding 
to a similar question in April 1996, Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryutaro refused to 
define the Asia-Pacific, saying it is ‘counter-productive to determine which countries 
are included and which ones are excluded’ (228-29). Moreover, Foreign Minister 
Komura Masahiko argued in January 1998 that the activities of the US troops are not 
restricted to the Far East, but conceivably include areas around the Far East; and 
whether or not areas surrounding Japan stretches beyond the Far East is beyond the 
purview of the MSA (239). With respect to Surrounding Areas, the Director-General 
of JDA, Kyuma Akio, reiterated Hashimoto’s October 1997 assertion of the need to 
disaggregate them from the Far East. In November 1999, he stated that the New 
Guidelines include activities not mentioned within the MSA to the extent that 
Surrounding Areas need to be understood as a situational concept (242-43). In January 
of that year, Prime Minister Obuchi Keizo suggested that it is not possible to 
determine which geographical location is included in Surrounding Areas before an 
event emerges (243). 
Furthermore, the North Korean nuclear issue makes it even more difficult to 
reconcile ‘situational concept’ with events with clear geographical focus. During the 
1999 Diet session, the Director General of Defence Agency, Norota Hosei, was asked 
to define what is meant by the Surrounding Areas. Instead of providing a definition, 
Norota explained various manifestations, including: conflicts in Surrounding Areas; 
situations in which conflicts in Surrounding Areas might emerge; situations whereby 
conflicts have ceased, but instability remains in Surrounding Areas; and situations 
within which the UNSC determines that there are threats to peace and security that 
might influence Japan’s safety (Tamaki, 2007: 217). According to Tamaki Kazuhiko 
(2007: 217-16), sanctions against North Korea, including visitation rights on vessels, 
might fall within the purview of Surrounding Areas, thereby forcing Tokyo to identify 
Pyongyang’s provocation as an emergency—with obvious consequences. Thus, 
situational notion might be useful in addressing potential, domestic, opposition; but its 
ambiguity also carries inherent foreign policy risks for Japan.   
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Taiwan or Not to Taiwan 
 
The cohabitation of the under-defined Far East, the Asia-Pacific, and Surrounding 
Areas within the official narratives represents the resilience of perceived threats from 
the Korean Peninsula and especially the Taiwan Strait. The former JDA Vice Minister, 
Akiyama Masahiro, recalls that the ‘primary concern was the Korean Peninsula; and 
that Japan’s role in forging global peace and stability was an abstract concept’ at the 
time when the 1996 US-Japan Communiqué and the New Guidelines were 
negotiated.17 Asahi shimbun notes that the Japanese government remains reluctant to 
admit whether the Taiwan Strait is part of the Surrounding Areas as a way to placate 
China.18 This sensitivity dates back to the normalisation talks between Tokyo and 
Beijing in 1972 during which Taiwan became an issue. The then-Prime Minister, 
Tanaka Kakuei, stated in July 1972 that there is no reason to believe MSA is 
compromised as a result of normalisation, given that the Chinese government had 
decided not to raise significant issues with respect to Taiwan (Tanaka, 1997: 241-42; 
Mori, 2006: 73-74). The emergence of China adds to the uncertainties in which 
Taiwan remains a taboo, but the ‘reality’ of China as a potential threat in the region 
and beyond exacerbates Tokyo’s anxieties. The 2005 edition of the Defence of Japan 
(JDA, 2005: 96) is noteworthy in its explicit mention of China and the Taiwan Strait. 
In addition to the usual constellation of signifiers, it takes note of Chinese submarines 
within Japanese territorial waters, urging Beijing to become a responsible member of 
the international community (137-38). The 2010 edition of the Whitepaper reiterates 
Tokyo’s anxieties over an ‘increasingly confident’ China and that the ‘uncertainties in 
their security and military policy-making process’ are disconcerting (kenen jiko).19 
Such concerns compel MOD to encourage closer co-operation with the US on 
‘Chinese affairs’ (Chugoku josei) and ‘China-Taiwan relations’ (Chu-Tai kankei) 
(JDA, 2005: 138) to address ‘new threats and various events, as well as 
indeterminacies in the Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Strait’ (142). Anxieties are 
magnified by the multifaceted nature of Japan’s perceptions of China. The 2009 
                                                 
17 Akiyama quoted in, ‘Boei to kokusai-heiwa-kyoryoku to ampo gaiko-senryaku do kakuka’, Asahi 
shimbun (Web edition), 20 March 2007. <www.asahi.com/strategy.0320a.html>. 
18  ‘Shuhen jitai taio ni fushin to kitai’, Asahi shimbun (Web edition), 17 April 
2007.<www.asahi.com/strategy/0417a.html>. Accessed 17 June 2010. 
19 MOD, Nippon no boei (2010). <www.clearing.mod.go.jp/hakusho_data/2010/2010/index.html>. 
Accessed 20 September 2010. 
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Strategic Review (JDA, 2009: 260) identifies various ‘implications’. First, the military 
implication centres on Tokyo’s ambivalence towards China as both a potential stake-
holder in the stability of the region, as well as a potential threat underpinned by ‘their 
activities in surrounding areas’ (shuhen ni okeru katsudo) (ibid.). The second 
implication is diplomatic: either China is a potential threat to Japan’s diplomatic 
prestige, or it can engage in a ‘healthy competition for regional stability’ (ibid.). 
Finally, China is a potential ‘transnational’ partner (ibid.). They reflect traditional 
security concerns, while at the same time, Tokyo remains circumspect that China as a 
stakeholder might facilitate Japan in addressing new dangers beyond the Asia-Pacific 
region. 
 It is not surprising that Taiwan remains within Japan’s gaze, along with the 
Korean Peninsula, as it involves balance of power between China and the US, and 
hence, Japan’s alliance commitments. Yahuda (2011: 325) argues that Japan 
expressed concern during the 1995-96 Sino-American standoff given that the Chinese 
‘missiles [were] being directed to the north of Taiwan near the territorial waters of 
one of its most southern islets’. Despite the rhetorical conundrum in determining 
whether or not the Taiwan Strait falls within the purview of Surrounding Areas, 
Tokyo’s concern with Chinese military spending became more paramount. Coupled 
with the Korean Peninsula, Japan felt that ‘the Chinese side appeared to be pressing 
for the long-term withdrawal of American forces from Japan without the Chinese 
acknowledging that the Japanese had any legitimate security needs of their own’ (326). 
For Tokyo, the dangers were evident in the Taiwan Strait; but the question was 
whether this warranted labelling as Surrounding Areas. 
 This ambivalence translates into an official muddle. An LDP delegation to 
China, led by Secretary General, Kato Koichi, reassured the hosts in July 1997 that 
the Surrounding Areas refer to the Korean Peninsula but not Taiwan. However, Chief 
Cabinet Secretary Kajiyama rebuked Kato, insisting that there is ‘no question that the 
Korean Peninsula remains our primary concern, but it is inappropriate to rule out 
other places’ (Shimoda, 2006: 83). Kajiyama ‘clarified’ that Taiwan is, indeed, 
included, provoking an uproar from Beijing (ibid.). However, a MOFA official, 
Takano Toshiyuki, told the Diet Foreign Affairs Committee in May 1998 that 
Surrounding Areas do not cover areas beyond the Far East as defined within the MSA 
(Koike and Maeda, 2007: 248). This implied that Surrounding Areas are, indeed, a 
geographical concept (Shimoda, 2006: 84)—something vehemently denied by Kyuma, 
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arguing that it is a ‘mistake’ to suggest that Surrounding Areas are geographical 
(Shimoda, 2006: 84; Koike and Maeda, 2007: 248-49). The transition from ‘where’ to 
‘what’ had been fraught with difficulties; and the sensitivities toward China add to the 
sense of creeping dangers. Indeed, the 2009 Strategic Review (NIDS, 2009: 231) 
recognises that Japan still operates neither in a ‘normal’ (heiji) or ‘emergency’ (yuji) 
situation, but within an ‘intermediate realm’ (chukan ryoiki). 
 The official ambiguity of Surrounding Areas represents Tokyo that is in 
between change and continuity. On the one hand, the change is easier to detect. The 
regional designation—whether be it the Far East or the Asia-Pacific—was augmented 
by an even more ambiguous, but equally ambitious, situational term. The new 
delineation provides Japan with a justification to send troops to areas beyond the 
purview of its previous defence periphery, citing unknowable, yet omnipresent, 
danger that satisfies Japan’s urge to become a responsible member of the international 
community. On the other hand, the continuity exposes itself in the form of resilient 
threat perception emanating from the Korean Peninsula and China, as well as a sense 
of vulnerability deriving from the need to secure SLOCs.20 China’s nervousness over 
Taiwan remains a reality for Japanese foreign policy; but it provides an opportunity 
for the Surrounding Areas narrative to enhance its potency as a foreign policy 
signifier. Hence, it denotes a recalibration, rather than a re-definition, of Japan’s Asia 
imaginary. 
 
 
Prospects for Further Recalibration? 
 
The landslide victory by the DPJ in the August 2009 general election provides an 
interesting moment of reflection. It is still premature to assess whether the new 
government will instigate fundamental changes to the dominant narratives of Japanese 
threat perception; or whether the process of recalibration will continue. Leif-Eric 
Easley et al. (2010) argue that there are potentials for change; but in the short- to 
intermediate term, Japanese foreign policy under the DPJ should not transform 
dramatically. On the one hand, the DPJ election Manifesto calls for more ‘equal’ 
partnership with the US (kinmitsu de taito na Nichibei domei), pledging to proactively 
                                                 
20  For Japan’s continuing sense of vulnerability with respect to the security of SLOCs and piracy in 
Southeast Asia, see Graham, 2006: ch. 7; Acharya, 2001: 75. 
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(sekkyoku-tekin ni) carry out its responsibilities (Paragraph 51).21 This is striking, 
given that the Party was opposed to extending refuelling activities in the Indian Ocean 
beyond the January 2010 deadline, as well as its earlier intention of renegotiating the 
relocation of US Marines from Okinawa. On the other hand, the Party seeks to 
maintain international contribution, including combating piracy (Paragraph 54), albeit 
without a clear suggestion of how this is to be accomplished. Indeed, the DPJ only 
mentions that it will ‘consider’ subsequent policy options in due course.22 
 Despite DPJ’s promise to create a more equal partnership with the US, the 
Party suggests that the MSA still forms the basis of Japanese security policy and 
forms the linchpin of peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. 23  While in 
opposition, the Party proclaimed its unease over the New Guidelines, pointing out that 
they equate to constitutional amendment by stealth in widening the constitutional 
reinterpretation, enabling forward deployment of SDF without the United Nations 
mandate. 24  Yet, it also suggests that the DPJ is not complacent in addressing 
exigencies (Nippon yuji); but rather it is making sure that events in Surrounding Areas 
(shuhen jitai) be considered in relation to Japan’s policy of exclusive defence (senshu 
boei).25 Hence, the MSA remains the basis for DPJ’s foreign policy as well, refraining 
from revoking the New Guidelines for the time being. 
 The geographical signifiers of Japan’s defence periphery remain vague, 
although the Party seems to redefine Surrounding Areas into something more concrete. 
While it suggests remaining within the framework of MSA, it nevertheless points out 
the importance of maintaining peace and security in the Far East and areas around the 
Far East (kyokuto oyobi kyokuto shuhen no chiiki)—the kind of linguistic gymnastics 
reminiscent of the muddle in the mid-1990s.26 Superficially, this indicates an implicit 
move away from a situational definition back into a more specific, geographical, 
delineation. However, the vagueness remains to the extent that the DPJ is equally 
aware of new dangers facing Japan. Coupled with the Party’s suggestion that the 
Coast Guard, rather than the MSDF, should be involved in efforts to combat piracy in 
                                                 
21  DPJ Manifesto. <www.dpj.or.jp/special/manifesto2009/txt/manifesto2009.txt>. Accessed 2 
September 2009. 
22   Nihon keizai shimbun (Web edition), 2 September 2009. <www. 
nikkei.co.jp/senkyo/2009shuin/elecnews/20090902AS350200L02092009.html>.  Accessed 9 
September 2009. 
23  DPJ, 17 February 2009. <www.dpj.or.jp/news/?num=15257>. Accessed 2 September 2009. 
24 DPJ, 26 April 1999. <www.dpj.or.jp/news/?num=1-836>. Accessed 2 September 2009. 
25  DPJ, 26 April 1999. <www.dpj.or.jp/news/?num=1-836>. Accessed 2 September 2009. 
26  DPJ, 28 October 1998. <www.dpj.or.jp/news/?num=10834>. Accessed 2 September 2009. 
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the Indian Ocean,27 it seems that the DPJ agrees with the LDP that Tokyo should 
enhance its international contribution. Easley et al. (2010: 6) note that, 
 
 The vast majority of DPJ members consider the US-Japan alliance an essential 
 stabilizer in the Asia-Pacific region but are reluctant to work with the United 
 States in ways that involve dispatching the Japanese Self-Denfense Forces 
 (JSDF) overseas…..The DPJ’s ‘Basic Policy’ puts the alliance with the Untied 
 States at the center of Japan’s security policy, and other major policy 
 statements also endorse the alliance. 
 
Even on the eve of the Upper House election in July 2010, the DPJ Manifesto repeats 
its pledge to forge a closer, yet equal, partnership with the US. As for Okinawa, the 
U-turn by the Hatoyama cabinet is reflected in the ambiguous phrase in referring to 
the Futenma airbase, stating that ‘we will work towards alleviating the burden borne 
by Okinawa in accordance with the bilateral agreement’ (DPJ, 2010: 11). As it is 
expected from a largely centre-left party, the DPJ intends to uphold the principles of 
pacifism (12).  
 Superficially, the difference between the new DPJ government and its LDP 
predecessor lies in the determination of the circumstances under which the SDF can 
be deployed for national security, as well as maintaining Japan’s international prestige. 
Indeed, the June 2011 US-Japan Joint Statement of the Security Consultative 
Committee reiterates the familiar set of themes, ranging from North Korea (p. 3); 
calling for China to play a ‘responsible and constructive role in regional stability and 
prosperity’ (p. 4); as well as maintaining ‘safety and security of the maritime domain’ 
(p. 5).28 Given that the DPJ does not reject MSA, but instead, proposes to enhance 
Japan’s role in it, the issue of how far the SDF can and should be utilised will remain 
contested. However, given the DPJ’s stress on the MSA as the basis for Japanese 
foreign and security policies, along with its reiteration of ‘peace and stability’, 
references to pacifism remain intact, suggesting that future debates will centre on how, 
not whether, Japan should maintain its international role.  
 
 
                                                 
27 DPJ, 28 January 2009. <www.dpj.or.jp/news/?num=15092>. Accessed 2 September 2009. 
28 It is noteworthy that the Joint Statement mentions that Tokyo and Washington ‘welcome India as a 
strong and enduring Asia-Pacific partner’ (p. 5). This seems to be a clear indication that both the US 
and Japan identify China as a contemporary source of danger. See Joint Statement of the Security 
Consultative Committee: Towards a Deeper and Broader US-Japan Alliance: Building on 50 Years of 
Partnership. 21 June 2011. 
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Conclusion 
 
Ambiguities inherent within the official narratives of Surrounding Areas fulfil the 
dual purpose for Japanese policy makers seeking to improve Tokyo’s international 
reputation by rationalising its involvement in the so-called ‘War on Terror’, while 
simultaneously re-discovering the newly emergent sources of danger that are present 
but not fully realisable. In one respect, this process might be understood as Japan 
acquiescing to the US pressure in augmenting its own military involvement in the 
‘War on Terror’ and the security of the Asia-Pacific in general. To that extent, the 
elaboration of Surrounding Areas into a situational term simply expands the scope of 
Far East as Japan’s defence perimeter in order to satisfy the alliance partner. Indeed, 
the new DPJ government objects to this, which explains its assertion that the Party 
seeks ‘equal partnership’ with the US instead. Yet, a detailed reading of the 
Surrounding Areas narratives suggests that there is a cohabitation of Japan’s resilient 
image of Asia as a potentially dangerous neighbourhood, on the one hand; with 
Tokyo’s perceived imperative to live up to its self-proclaimed role as a pacifist state 
willing to take initiatives in promoting interdependence, on the other (Tamaki, 2010: 
ch. 3). Perhaps the previous DPJ government’s dithering over Futenma Air Base is 
one illustration of the new recalibration process.  
 The cohabitation of resilient danger and the ever-changing international 
environment attests to the reification of Asia within Japan’s identity construction. 
Whether be it Yamagata’s delineation of the cordon of sovereignty or interest; or the 
anxiety over the security of SLOC both before and after the War, they all converge on 
one point: that Asia has always been a source of danger for Japanese existence.29 
Moreover, Tokyo’s gaze upon the post-Cold War—and post-9/11—international 
environment suggests that danger is now ‘everywhere’ to the extent that Asia as a 
notional signifier and as a source of danger is consolidated into a new narrative of 
anxiety. This shows that the reconstruction of Japanese Self goes hand in hand with 
the re-assessment of threat; and that the urge to re-define and redress danger is very 
much an integral part of identity reconstruction. Needless to say, the change is 
incremental rather than drastic; but the subtlety is characteristic of how the 
recalibration of threat perception based on a familiar frame of reference takes place. It 
                                                 
29 For detailed discussions on Asia as a historical source of insecurity for Japan, see Duus (1995);  
Miyoshi (1991);  Maruyama (1961);  and Graham (2006).  
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is a process based on addressing the contemporary worldview informed through a 
historically constructed regional imaginary. 
 The significance of Surrounding Areas as an ambiguity indicates that Asia is 
still very much a dynamic region that necessitates flexibility and entails contingency; 
and even the DPJ’s designation of the Far East and areas around the Far East attest to 
this. Tokyo’s emerging sense of threat beyond the familiar confines of the Asia-
Pacific region provides ample source of anxieties for Japan. Obscuring the regional 
term into a situational signifier needs to be understood as a recalibration of Japan’s 
Asian existence whereby Japan seeks to resolve this slippage. As such, Tokyo’s 
penchant for the pacifist narrative remains robust in spite of the alarm within the 
neighbouring capitals. The seeming contradiction between this and Japan’s enhanced 
role in the so-called ‘War on Terror’ is representative of this regional dynamism. This 
implies that the challenges ahead for Japanese policy makers to tread a fine line 
between maintaining its international profile, on the one hand; and placating sceptical 
Asian governments, on the other, are formidable. Tokyo is, and will be, recalibrating 
its threat perception no matter who is in charge of the country. 
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